Abstract-In this paper, we describe an attack against one of the Oblivious-Transfer-based blind signatures scheme, proposed in [1]. An attacker with a primitive capability of producing specific-range random numbers, while exhibiting a partial MITM behavior, is able to corrupt the communication between the protocol participants. The attack is quite efficient as it leads to a protocol communication corruption and has a sound-minimal computational cost. We propose a solution to fix the security flaw.
1
OT , described above, has been replaced by mechanisms of 1 n OT shown in [3] , where the Sender dispatch N message to the Chooser, and the Chooser selects the appropriate message without knowing the initial selection of the Sender.
In reports [6] and [7] , the OT mechanism is combined with various cryptographic techniques, in order to provide the involved participants with even more security guarantees. OT is combined with signature schemes providing strong fairness, anonymity and privacy of the communication. Both of the reports also provide a detailed analysis of the protocol in terms of anonymity and privacy. There are also reports like [8] , where security threats over the OT-based protocol schemes have been classified into high and low cost attacks. All these kinds of security threats are managed to succeed regarding the computational cost of the encryption used between the protocols' participants, where an adversary is consider containing the maximum computational power, performing a variety of attack actions.
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double blind signature scheme protocol described in [1] . More precisely, we show that a partial MITM intruder with a low computational cost can corrupt the protocol's communication by integrity violating one of the protocols' exchanged messages (by tagging specific random numbers). As a result the protocols' agents will accept the corruption occurred, which misinterprets the overall communication.
II. THE OT-BASED BLIND SIGNATURE PROTOCOL
This paper focuses on the analysis of a variant 1-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer ( 1 n OT ) based on blind signatures protocol. The specific protocol incorporates a blind mechanism from both the Sender's and the Chooser's side. To achieve cryptographic efficiency the protocol involves a series of security perspectives such as public key cryptography, blind signatures and a keyed hash function. A random number generator for both of the participants is also used in order to overcome predictability attacks caused by an Intruder. The following notation is used throughout the paper:
Blind Signature for the Sender
Right shift-bit operator The Sender has n input secret strings, { 0 ,..., n S S  }-{ S  }. On the other hand, the Sender should learn nothing about  . The protocol described here provides unconditional protection for the Chooser and computational protection in the random oracle model for the Sender. Due to the OT operability, the specific protocol may be often invoked multiple times between the participants.
The basic steps of the described protocol are illustrated in Fig.1 and can be summarized as follows:
Attacking an OT-Based Blind Signature Scheme n  . Then, Sender selects his RSA keys and sends them along with the set of its numbers to the Chooser.
2) Upon the first message is receipted, the Chooser will randomly (according to σ ) select a number U  and compute the ( ) SP U  , which in turn, it is blinded with a random selected number C, in order to produce ( ) e SP U C   . He then sends the message to Sender.
3) When the Sender receives the second message, he randomly selects his blind factor R (random number). Then he signs (with SK<N, d>) and blinds (with R) the message, creating {( ( ) As a security-consequence of the protocol's completion, the outcome will be the preservation of information-theoretic privacy for the Sender and computational privacy for the Chooser according to [1] .
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK
Similar security analysis reports, such as [8] , have indicated security threats that may be launched in OT-based communication systems. The majority of them are based over an intruder that eavesdrop all the protocols' messages, containing also a degree of computational power that may reveal to him, previously unknown information. An Intruder may launch a series of actions that could lead the protocols' participants into security failures, such as a DoS attack from the Chooser's side, or impersonations using previously recorded Sender's messages in other (same protocol) sessions. While the protocol avoids those kinds of attacks by using double-blind signatures for both of its participants, it may allow Intruder's integrity violations, by leading to a corrupt communication. In the rest of this section, we present the attack where an Intruder, being placed as a MITM entity may corrupt the proposed protocol.
A. Description of the Attack
The necessary prerequisites for the Intruder are the following: a) The Intruder is a MITM entity among the protocols' participants that eavesdrops all the messages, b) he has the ability of generating random numbers over a specific range of values and c) he can concatenate previously intercepted messages with data that he has created. Fig. 2 provides a detailed description of the attack mounted against the protocol. The proposed attack is described as follows:
1) In the first step, the Intruder leaves the first message uninterrupted to reach its intended destination. Chooser upon receipt of the message, selects, under uniform probability distribution, a number U  according to his input σ that he had initially chosen; then he generates random number C blinding ( ) SP U  to form the second message.
2) Through a compromised channel, the Intruder receives the second message ( ) e SP U C   originated from the Chooser. Then, the Intruder, using a random number generator, corrupts the message with a random number 3) Producing the appropriate keys 0.. 1 j n K   , the corrupted product will be intersected into the (( ( ) ( ) )
